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Despite the size of their report, the Federal Trade Commission and
Department of Justice pay virtually no attention to tens of millions of uninsured and
underinsured persons. By focusing on an increasingly rarified group of health care
customers — healthy, affluent, and highly insured — the report takes on an untethered
quality, with only the slightest tip of the hat to its own limitations. Furthermore, the
report overstates the extent of legal constraints on the market, in particular, the degree
to which the market is free to select its customers and tailor its goods and services to
the best risks. By miscasting the legal context of the American health care system,
the report ultimately undermines much of its potential value.
Abstract

A Report Untethered from Reality

Size can be deceiving. Although the Federal Trade Commission/Department of Justice report, Improving Health Care: A Dose of Competition (FTC/DOJ 2004), on the role of competition in health care industry covers an enormous amount of ground, its basic flaw is the failure
to recognize the limitations of its own construct. As a result, the report
takes on a brittle and artificial quality; instead of focusing on the possible, the document conveys a sense of untetheredness from today’s health
care reality for a considerable portion of the U.S. population. The report
pays scant attention to tens of millions of people: the nearly 46 million
persons who are completely without coverage (DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, and Lee 2005); members of working-age families, who have a one-
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in-three chance of being without coverage over a two-year period (Families
USA 2004); the 52 million Medicaid beneficiaries (Kaiser Family Foundation 2005a); millions of individuals isolated from the social mainstream
by residence in impoverished rural and urban communities and barriers
related to language, poverty, lack of citizenship, and cultural apartness
(Rosenbaum, Shin, and Darnell 2004); and persons living in anything
less than the most affluent of circumstances, whose serious, chronic, and
costly physical and mental health conditions make them unattractive customers in a highly competitive market.
Improving Health Care gears its analysis to a world inhabited by educated, healthy, and financially comfortable health care consumers whose
personal circumstances not only make them desirable customers but also
equip them to navigate increasingly complex health insurance products
and health care choices. (Even this rarefied group is now beginning to
raise serious alarms about the dark side of consumer-driven health plans,
as underscored in a 2005 Washington Post article profiling the travails
of a prominent health policy figure in Washington, DC [Gearon 2005]).
Indeed, Improving Health Care essentially assumes a world in which all
health care consumers — like consumers of other goods and services sold
in the market — are created equal, and for whom sellers of health care
services will compete with equal gusto, if only they can be whipped into
competitive shape.
By focusing on solutions tailored to the characteristics of a rarefied
population, Improving Health Care dons blinders that in turn make the
study a strange and bewildering read, bordering on the outright disturbing. Its slight tip of the hat to its own limitations is contained in the following brief passage and admonition: “Competition also may worsen the
problems of the uninsured . . . by decreasing the ability of providers to
cross-subsidize some products and services. Competition will not transfer resources to those who do not have them. Proposals to address these
matters should be carefully evaluated to ensure that the consequences of
any reform are pro-competitive” (FTC/DOJ 2004: chap. 5, 28). This bare
acknowledgment of the downside of its recommendations appears in passing in chapter 6 of the study, rather than as a prominent caveat to its own
recommendations.
In short, the central dilemma with Improving Health Care (as well as
the set of theoretical constructs on which it rests) is not that it does a weak
job of placing its recommendations in context but, rather, that the agencies
ignore context entirely. In their analysis, major segments of the American
population — whose life circumstances simply are out of sync with the
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conceptual framework in vogue in Washington, DC, circa 2006 — simply cease to exist. This seeming breakdown in the relationship between
people and the formulation of a public policy framework by government is
not confined to this particular study, of course. In recent years, the nation’s
capital has witnessed the growth of a chasm of epic proportions between
what people need and what policy makers espouse. Congressional leaders
respond to federal deficits by proposing to slash expenditures for child
care, health care, food aid, foster care, child support, and other services
for the poor while preserving over $70 billion in planned tax breaks (Parrott and Shapiro 2005). Official efforts to publish evidence-based reports
on subjects such as health disparities and health care inequity are suppressed in favor of whitewashes so embarrassing that, when the censored
draft (inevitably) is leaked, the agency director must be permitted to post
the draft report, along with a letter that attempts to explain the incident
(Clancy 2004). Scientists and physicians opposed to the relaxation of governmental controls over childhood lead poisoning are removed from official government advisory committees. In public hearings, the Medicaid
program, which insures more than 50 million persons at a per-capita cost
significantly lower than the commercial coverage (Kaiser Family Foundation 2005a), is dismissed as a hotbed of financial abuse and state scams
(Barton 2004, 2005). A legislative proposal to permit states to disinsure
Medicaid beneficiaries is titled “Health Opportunity Accounts.”1
In the case of Improving Health Care, federal agencies charged with
enforcing laws related to market competition have simply decided to sidestep consideration of the obvious issues that arise when one attempts to
apply market theory to a health system lacking the means for allocating
health care resources on the basis of need rather than wealth and power.
The report might have addressed this potential deficiency by couching its
recommendations in a larger context of coverage reforms and interventions aimed at lessening nonmarket barriers, but this would have been
an admission of analytic limitation that neither agency could be permitted to make. As a result, the analysis is fundamentally undermined in
two ways: first, by its failure to address the more complex dynamics of
health care access that act as structural barriers to a more competitive
environment; and, second, by its failure to articulate for policy makers
and powerful health interests the essential precondition on which competition depends, namely, inclusion of the entire population in a health care-

1. S. 1833, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. Medicaid Health Opportunity Account Act of 2005.

660   Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law

financing scheme, coupled with certain regulatory interventions designed
to compensate for market failure. The agencies had an ideal opportunity
to convey these two basic points but did not do so, and as a result they
considerably diminish the value of their report.
Drilling Down on What the Report
Failed to Consider

Two aspects of the report’s omissions merit closer attention because of
their impact on the overall goal of competition in health care access. The
first is the legal framework for health care access. The second is those
dimensions of the access problem that extend beyond the purely economic
and necessitate consideration of sociodemographic and personal characteristics associated with reduced health care access.
The Legal Context for Health Care Access

There is no legal right to health care in the United States (Rosenblatt, Law,
and Rosenbaum 1997). U.S. expenditures and opinion polls underscore
the stock that Americans place in health care. Indeed, the Kaiser Family
Foundation (2004) reports that in national public opinion polls conducted
since 1992, health care has never ranked lower than fourth as a priority
issue for voters.
Many nations identify health care as a constitutional matter. In their
survey of world constitutions, Eleanor Kinney and Brian Alexander Clark
(2004) found that more than two-thirds of all constitutions contain provisions addressing health or health care and, furthermore, that, in almost
all constitutions, health care is expressed in universal terms rather than
being limited to certain populations. Faced with the need to balance societal needs against market conduct, other nations with first-world industrial economies and democratic governmental arrangements have opted
for a national public policy response in which society’s available financial resources are allocated across the population by various allocation
approaches, either alone or in combination with one another (Jost 2003).
We commonly think of these nations as having national health insurance systems, although their programs embody a wide range of strategies
related to the organization and financing of health care. Whatever the
strategy, the point is that, ultimately, government is accountable for system design, execution, and performance.
What is particularly important about the lack of a legal right to health
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care in the context of health care access is that, correspondingly, health
care providers have no legal duty to furnish care. The protests of marketeers to the contrary, the U.S. health care industry remains remarkably
free, under common-law and statutory principles, to choose its customers
and tailor products to attractive market segments. This fundamental freedom is curbed in only the most modest respects. For example, the Emergency Treatment and Women in Labor Act (EMTALA),2 an outgrowth
of earlier laws such as the Hospital Survey and Construction Act of 1946
(Hill Burton),3 requires the provision of certain emergency-related services on the part of Medicare-participating hospitals. After years of litigation and protest over this relatively narrowly drawn but privately enforceable legal obligation, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
in 2003 promulgated regulations that further narrow the EMTALA obligation with respect to screening and stabilization services as well as the
duty of hospitals to maintain on-call specialists (Rosenblatt, Rosenbaum,
and Frankford 2004).
Beyond EMTALA, federal laws impose virtually no duty of care on
health care providers. Furthermore, there is very little in the way of legal
prohibition against discrimination among patients. For example, other
than Hill Burton’s community service requirement, no federal law prohibits discrimination on the basis of health insurance status.4 As a result, the
health care industry remains unfettered in its freedom to select lucrative
payers and reject those, such as Medicaid beneficiaries, whose sponsorship is unprofitable.
Even where discrimination on the basis of race is concerned, U.S. law
is remarkably free of constraints. Thus, industry practices that may have a
discriminatory impact — such as practice location, participation in public
insurance, affiliation with community-based providers, or acceptance of
referral patients — go unchallenged, and the federal government collects
virtually no data regarding the racial and ethnic disparities that may result
from such market freedoms (Rosenbaum and Teitelbaum 2003). It is these
unintentional but systemic practices, which carry implications for racial
and ethnic minority populations, that tend to raise concern among experts
in health disparities (Institute of Medicine [IOM] 2002).
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits both intentional and de
facto discrimination by federally assisted entities on the basis of race or
2. 42 U.S.C. 1395dd.
3. 42 U.S.C. §291 et. seq.
4. 42 C.F.R. 124.603(e).
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national origin (which also includes language).5 From Medicare’s inception, however, an unwritten agreement between the Johnson administration and the Senate insulated participating physicians from the application
of Title VI, on the theory that the program’s original indemnity model
placed it outside the meaning of federal assistance in the case of physician
services (Smith 1999). Despite the transformation of Medicare’s physician
payment structure away from indemnification and toward direct payment,
this exemption remains in full force today, honored by the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) Office for Civil Rights (2003) almost
entirely without comment. Furthermore, regulations implementing Title
VI have not been modernized since their original promulgation forty
years ago and thereby fail to address their applicability to modern delivery systems participating in multiple-sponsor arrangements (Rosenbaum
and Teitelbaum 2003). Even the very limited accountability for the racial
implications of seemingly neutral practices has eroded further in recent
years, as a result of a decision by the United States Supreme Court declaring the law’s de facto discrimination prohibition to be essentially no longer privately enforceable.6 Finally, even when such practices were subject
to challenge, “business necessity” was an affirmative defense that could
defeat even a meritorious claim (Rosenbaum and Teitelbaum 2003).
Persons with disabilities do not fare much better in the health care marketplace, at least where the law is concerned. One of the more remarkable
laws in the context of civil rights and health care access is the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). In a dramatic departure from precedent, and with virtually no legislative history, the ADA classifies health
care as a public accommodation for purposes of its prohibition against
discrimination against qualified persons with disabilities, thereby bringing wholly private health care systems within the scope of its standards
(Teitelbaum and Rosenbaum 2003). The potentially far-reaching implications of this statutory classification of health care as a public accommodation became evident in a 1998 decision by the United States Supreme
Court, regarding a dentist’s arbitrary refusal to treat a patient with HIV.7
But even the ADA operates under severe constraints in the context of
health care finance. Where employee health benefits are concerned, a systematic narrowing of the definition of “qualified person with a disability”
by the United States Supreme Court means that the ADA can no longer
5. Lau v. Nichols 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
6. Alexander v. Sandoval 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
7. Bragdon v. Abbott 524 U.S. 624.

Rosenbaum

■

Vulnerable Populations   663  

be invoked as protection against employee health benefit plans that discriminate against various types of health conditions (National Council on
Disability 2004). Furthermore, even outside the employee health benefit
context, the courts have eviscerated the meaning of the ADA when applied
to health insurance. Leading judicial opinions have interpreted the ADA
as wholly irrelevant with respect to coverage content, leaving companies
free to engage in benefit design practices that have the effect of rendering
policies almost meaningless for persons with disabilities. Even where an
insurer stipulates in court documents that it lacks any actuarial basis for
its coverage restrictions, blatantly intentional coverage design is deemed
beyond the purview of the law. Thus, for example, in Doe v. Mutual of
Omaha,8 a federal appeals court found absolutely no legal violation under
the ADA as a result of a $25,000 HIV/AIDS cap imposed on plan enrollees by an insurer, despite the insurer’s admission that it “has not shown
and cannot show that its AIDS Caps are or ever have been consistent with
sound actuarial principles, actual or reasonably anticipated experience,
bona fide risk classification, or state law.”9
The king of all market deregulation laws may be the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).10 ERISA preemption doctrine is legendary, sweeping away even modest state law constraints on insurance
design in the self-insured employer-sponsored market. The fact that selfinsured ERISA health benefit plans operate free of design constraints other
than the limited standards found in ERISA itself (such as portability and
continuation coverage) inevitably has a chilling effect on states’ ability or
willingness to regulate the insured group market (Jacobson 1999; Rosenblatt, Rosenbaum, and Frankford 2001, 2004). The discretion of employer
plans is so absolute that they can maintain coverage benefit standards that
leave employees only with inappropriate treatment options; indeed, when
administrators write inappropriate treatment guidelines directly into the
plan documents, the limits are considered nonappealable constraints on
benefit design itself. Thus, in Jones v. Kodak Medical Assistance Plan,11
the court of appeals held that, by incorporating unpublished alcoholism
treatment coverage criteria directly into its plan documents, Kodak completely insulated itself from a medical necessity appeal and, furthermore,
that the company committed no violation of ERISA in not making its limitations public to plan participants and beneficiaries. The court’s opinion
8. 179 F. 3d. 557 (1999), reh. den. en banc (1999), cert. den. 528 U.S. 1106 (2000).
9. Doe v. Mutual of Omaha 179 F.3d 561.
10. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et. seq.
11. 169 F.3d 1287 (1999).
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regarding the merits of the patient’s appeal was perhaps best captured in
this passing comment about the Kodak plan: “Plan is entirely self-funded,
which means that Eastman Kodak employees do not contribute toward
the premiums. Rather, payment for covered medical care comes out of
company revenues.”12 The fact that employees give up compensation in
exchange for coverage went totally unnoticed by the court in its reflection
on corporate largesse and discretion.
This brief review of the legal framework governing health care in the
United States suggests that, far from burdening the market, U.S. law can
be characterized in precisely the opposite way, as extraordinarily generous
to a trillion-dollar-plus industry, which is left free to pick its markets and
its customers to design its products, virtually unconstrained by obligations
related to equitable access. The types of constraints on market conduct
that the nation has come to expect in the context of housing, for example — an equally private enterprise — simply are not in evidence where
health care is concerned. There is no health care equivalent to federal fairhousing legislation. Financial conduct that redlines the sick and disabled
is dismissed as nonchallengeable decisions regarding benefit design; and
benefit design standards at both the federal and state levels are minimal
to nonexistent. When state insurance coverage laws are held up to close
scrutiny, even laws related to basic services such as childhood immunizations are shown to be riddled with limitations and caveats. A recent study
of childhood immunization insurance mandates found that in no state are
insurers obligated to cover all Centers for Disease Control and Prevention – recommended vaccines for children (Rosenbaum et al. 2003).
What this legal framework means in the context of the FTC/DOJ report
is fairly self-evident. If this level of market freedom is the hallmark of a
regulated health system, what would be the implications of further deregulation? How much more market power can the population stand, particularly persons whose poverty, health needs, or dependence on public
insurance makes them unattractive customers? What more do the agencies want? Indeed, the current legal environment already tolerates a ready
arsenal of tactics to limit access; these tactics range from discriminatory
design of coverage offerings to selective marketing, selective location of
practices and services, refusal to participate in public insurance or other
programs subsidizing health care for the uninsured, and selective contracting with health care providers to limit participation by those serving
complex and difficult cases that might attract the wrong customers. No
12. 169 F.3d 1289.
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federal laws bar such conduct. How much more unconstrained can we
get? And, if the limited constraints that do exist were removed, how many
more “drags on the system” might be thrown overboard in the name of
competition?
What the FTC/DOJ Report Omitted from
Its Health Care Access Discussion

Just as the report fails to come clean about the legal environment for
health care access, it also tends to downplay the magnitude of the health
care access problem. This underreporting and downplaying occurs in two
ways: first, by mischaracterizing the magnitude of the uninsured problem;
and, second, by failing to explore those access barriers that transcend
insurance coverage.
How the Report Mischaracterizes the Uninsured Problem. The analysis
attempts to frame the problem of lack of insurance coverage as one that,
while worth noting in a few passages, does not carry any real significance in the context of policy implications. The uninsured are portrayed
as “fluid” (“A substantial majority of those currently uninsured will not be
uninsured a year from now” [FTC/DOJ 2004: chap. 5, 24]). The portrait
that emerges from the four and a half pages in toto devoted to the discussion of insurance is that of relatively affluent and healthy individuals who
experience short periods without coverage and who simply have made a
discretionary decision not to purchase it. Even a cursory review of the
evidence shows just the opposite: two-thirds of the uninsured are low
income, and one-third lives in poverty; more than a third report needing
health care but not getting it; and over three-quarters of the uninsured at
any given time will have been uninsured for the previous twelve months
(Kaiser Family Foundation 2005b).
The lack of health insurance is far grimmer and entrenched than the
FTC and DOJ would have readers believe, and with good reason: by their
own admission, competition would exacerbate the health care access problem for uninsured persons. One need only juxtapose Improving Health
Care against thorough reports on the uninsured to grasp the magnitude
of the understatement. In this regard, perhaps the most important work
is a multiphase project conducted by the Institute of Medicine, which
over a several-year period examined the problem of health insurance and
its consequences in great depth. The IOM concluded that the problem is
“large, growing and persistent” and noted its significant association with
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the receipt of health care, health status, sickness, and death (IOM 2004).
The IOM’s work portrayed a problem with societal implications reaching
well beyond its immediate impact on individuals without coverage and
extending to families and entire communities. One would think that this
ecological approach would have held great interest for the DOJ and FTC,
since so many of their recommendations go to geographic markets, yet the
agencies appeared to make no use of these findings as they crafted their
recommendations.
One of the most unsettling aspects of the FTC/DOJ report is its failure
to consider the impact of the insurance problem on specific subpopulations. Without examining subpopulation experiences, the report leaves
itself in no position to assess the import of its recommendations on particular subgroups such as low-income persons and members of racial and
ethnic minority groups. Thus, for example, more than one-third of the
poor and 30 percent of the near poor (family incomes at or below 200
percent of the federal poverty level) were uninsured in 2003. Together
these two population subgroups amount to 88 million persons (Kaiser
Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured 2004). Similarly, the report
mentions the large number of “young immortals” without coverage but
at the same time fails to note that persons aged thirty-five and over made
up nearly 40 percent of the uninsured population, a smaller proportion
to be sure than younger Americans, but of potentially far greater concern to the health care system. Twenty-nine percent of children, and 40
percent of non-elderly adults, in fair to poor health status, are uninsured
(ibid.).
Improving Health Care makes no mention of the racial and ethnic characteristics of the uninsured, despite the fact that minority groups are disproportionately represented. Lack of health insurance was a fact of life in
2003 for more than one in five African Americans and over one in three
Hispanic Americans, compared with fewer than one in eight white persons. Together, racial and ethnic minority groups comprised the majority
of uninsured persons that year (ibid.).
Nor does the report address evidence of disparities in health status by
source of insurance coverage, although this would seem critical to fashioning competition recommendations that ensure at least some semblance
of cross-payer parity in a competitive system. For example, Medicaid beneficiaries are four times more likely than those with employer coverage
and over twice as likely as the uninsured to report being in fair to poor
health (ibid.).
These data, taken together, suggest that certain distinct and highly vulner-
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able subpopulations could bear the brunt of adverse access consequences
that might be expected from greater competition, and yet the dimensions
of the problem go undiscussed. Nor does the report discuss interventions
that might be used to mitigate access barriers facing underserved populations, such as investment in health centers and other publicly supported
primary-care entry points into the health system (IOM 2000; Rosenbaum,
Shin, and Darnell 2004; Strunk and Cunningham 2004). Of course, once
the establishment of primary-care entry points such as health centers is
identified as a possible option for remedying the maldistribution of health
care resources, it becomes necessary to address the evidence showing
that, despite the quality of their care, health centers face serious problems
securing adequate specialty care for their patients (Gusmano, Fairbrother,
and Park 2002). Addressing this problem may necessitate market intervention through regulations aimed at ensuring minimum affiliation relationships between the health care safety net and specialty and inpatient
providers, but such a recommendation would be an admission of need for
at least modest regulatory remedies to overcome market failure.
Conclusion

Examining the FTC/DOJ report through the lens of health care access,
one gets the distinct sense of operating in a parallel universe. One universe
is inhabited by well- insured affluent persons, whose coverage derives
through large and powerful group purchasers whose health care-purchasing
efficiencies could be greatly improved. The other universe is inhabited
by tens of millions of uninsured, underinsured, and medically vulnerable persons, who are at risk for a host of health care access barriers and
adverse health outcomes.
In the first universe, the central problem is too much spending for too
little value, and the remedies are deregulation and the use of competitive purchasing tools that will slowly but surely cause prices to fall while
improving quality for affluent and educated consumers. In the second
universe, the central problem is millions of people who barely have a
hold on the health care system. The implications for the inhabitants of
the second universe of the remedies from the first universe are never considered; indeed, this second universe is simply not considered. In their
defense, perhaps, neither the FTC nor the DOJ is charged with the duty
to develop policies that promote equitable access to health care. But when
the government issues a report of this magnitude, should the public not
expect that major federal agencies would feel at least a small obligation
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to draw policy makers’ attention to the implications of their proposals for
the medically underserved and vulnerable?
To have produced a report that attempts to straddle and reconcile both
universes, the FTC and DOJ would have had to deal forthrightly with the
problem of access. Probably for reasons linked to fundamental ideology
and outlook, as well as the ferocious control over information flow that
now dominates the nation’s capital, the report fails to do this. As Jost and
colleagues point out in this issue, straddling the two worlds would have
necessitated addressing the lack of legal and societal protections where
health care access is concerned. By attempting to ignore the world of the
uninsured and underserved, the FTC and DOJ ironically end up doing
more damage to their own cause than if they had dealt with the limits
of competition in a straightforward manner and had, without flinching,
outlined the conditions that might make true competition possible in the
United States.
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